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ABSTRACT
Performance indicators, which are simply variables that help to measure
change, have been highly contentious in the area of Aboriginal health. This
discussion paper focuses on the introduction of performance indicators for
Aboriginal Health Services by the former Department of Aboriginal Affairs
and subsequent attempts by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission (ATSIC) to implement their collection. This paper addresses
some of the difficulties implicit in the way in which performance indicators
have been linked to funding allocations, and the difficulties experienced by
Aboriginal community-controlled health services in providing the data
requested. Often the data requested in the past have not been relevant either
to monitoring performance, or to assessing health status. The paper
examines conceptual problems associated with indicators, and makes
overall policy recommendations.
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Foreword
Early in 1994, due to an unexpected staff resignation, the Centre for
Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR) had some discretionary
resources for visiting fellowships. At that time a vibrant policy debate
raged, especially in the popular media, about the reasons for the continuing
poor health status of indigenous Australians despite apparent considerable
program effort. I decided that this was a policy issue replete with economic
policy implications, both directly, in terms of the economic question about
the most effective option to expend scarce health dollars for maximum
outcomes, and also indirectly in terms of the unquestionable linkages
between health status, labour force status and, ultimately, economic status.
CAEPR staff had also undertaken research both on evaluating outcomes
from special programs and on the relative efficacy of special versus
mainstream programs for indigenous Australians. The health policy debate
fitted squarely into this context.
I initially approached Maggie Brady, Visiting Research Fellow at the
Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies to visit
CAEPR. Maggie is a renowned researcher on the causes and consequences
of alcohol and substance abuse among indigenous Australians; over the
years, she had undertaken considerable field research, primarily as an
anthropologist, in many remote Aboriginal communities. Maggie accepted
this invitation and visited CAEPR for three months from July to
September. Simultaneously, I approached Ian Anderson, Chief Executive
Officer of the Victorian Aboriginal Health Service, and a medical
practioner, to visit CAEPR. Owing to other commitments, including part-
time postgraduate studies in anthropology at La Trobe University, Ian was
not able to visit CAEPR for a prolonged period. Instead, he visited
Canberra on three separate occasions to collaborate with Maggie.
While Ian and Maggie were with CAEPR the interagency review of the
National Aboriginal Health Strategy launched in 1989, began. The research
presented in this discussion paper is the revised version of a submission
made by them jointly to the review. All too often such submissions are
neither subjected to peer review nor published. The CAEPR Discussion
Paper series provides an avenue for this important piece of research to be
disseminated to a wider audience. Further research on indigenous health
policy will be published by CAEPR later in the year.
Jon Altman
Series Editor
April 1995
Introduction
It must be remembered that Aboriginal people suffer the poorest level of health of
any identifiable group of Australians. This situation demands far-sighted and
negotiated policies, objectives and strategies and demands that evaluation of
Aboriginal health care services be professionally researched and performed, and
carried out in a spirit of trust and cooperation.
(Moodie 1987: 13)
This paper examines the background and present context of government
attempts to evaluate progress towards improving Aboriginal health and the
use of performance indicators as part of monitoring health processes.
Performance indicators, introduced at many levels of government at a time
when 'management by objectives' was adopted in Australia in the late
1980s, have remained an area of confusion within Aboriginal health. Why
they are needed, how they are established and the uses to which indicators
are put have all been subject to a high level of debate and dissension. This
paper aims to examine the reasons for this as well as discussing what a
'performance indicator' is, and what it means.
Performance indicators are variables which help to measure change. For
example, the World Health Organisation (WHO) stated that with the ideal
to attain health for all by the year 2000, member states need to know what
progress they are making towards this goal and to this end need to
introduce a systematic monitoring and evaluation process and develop
indicators of progress (WHO 1981: 10).
The issue of program evaluation can evoke profoundly polarised views. In
the highly politicised environment of Aboriginal health, performance
indicators have at times been highly contentious. This in itself is not
surprising - performance indicators tend to focus contested claims for
resources. Implicit in the construction and use of these indicators are
ideological assumptions about the objectives that underlie resource
allocation processes in Aboriginal health. Consequently, tying this form of
performance evaluation to funding cycles often exacerbates an already
highly inflamed situation.
International influences
There are two broad trajectories that have had an underlying, and at times
contradictory, effect on the process of evaluating and indicating progress in
Aboriginal health in Australia, which have influenced the management of
government funds at a federal level, and impacted on the direction of health
policies in this country.
The first of these was the pledge in the early 1980s by member states of
WHO to participate in the Global Strategy for health for all by the year
2000 sufficient to 'permit people to lead a socially and economically
productive life'. Integral to this process was the need for indicators of
progress and change in health status which would contribute in a positive
way to governments' own self-assessment. Performance evaluation in this
context is broadly oriented to measuring the distribution of health and
health care resources between nations, and within nation states. The goal of
performance indicators is to measure the extent to which such changes in
distribution have occurred.
The second key trajectory has been the introduction of 'management by
objectives' in western industrialised countries, which has come to
incorporate program budgeting (Barrett 1992). WHO itself, in conjunction
with the Global Strategy, developed guidelines for what it termed a
'managerial process' for health development. This involves a continuous
process of programming by objectives and budgeting by programs. The
Department of Finance, in promoting the introduction of program
budgeting within the Australian public service stated that the development
of indicators should focus on questions of:
i efficiency, which is the relationship between the inputs and outputs;
ii effectiveness, which is the extent to which the impacts of a program's
output (that is its outcome) meet its objectives (Department of Finance
1985: 1).
The necessary components of this process include policy formulation, long
and medium-term programs, program budgeting and evaluation. Program
budgeting, endorsed by WHO as the means of managing its own
worldwide programs, is a process of identifying objectives or targets and
translating these into the costs required for their achievement. That
objectives have to be identified means that priorities have to be established,
and this is usually done in the process of developing policies.
In the deployment of performance evaluation for Commonwealth-targeted
Aboriginal health programs these two distinct influences have tended to
overlay each other. The redistributive and managerialist approaches share a
common interest in efficiency and outcomes. However, measures of
performance oriented towards evaluatingefficiency and effectiveness tend
to presume that resource inputs are a given, whilst re-distributive measures
presume the level of resources in the Aboriginal health sector are
inadequate. This leads to a lack of clarity as to which process has policy
priority. To what extent will outcomes be enhanced by driving the dollar
further, or to what extent is it necessary to increase current resource outlays
in Aboriginal health? In the end, this tension is insoluble without a clear
statement of policy principles.
It is the parallel and sometimes converging course of these two influences -
one an internationally agreed global target (health for all by the year 2000),
the other a method for governments to link costs to objectives and evaluate
progress towards those objectives - that constitutes an underlying theme for
this discussion paper.
We focus our comments on the implementation of performance indicators
for the Commonwealth-funded community-controlled Aboriginal Health
Services (AHS). In part this story needs to be contextualised with a brief
history of relationships between AHS and the state. After considering the
more specific history of the introduction of performance indicators, we
discuss some of the difficulties community agencies have in providing such
data. Finally, we consider some of the conceptual problems that have an
impact on the effective deployment of such performance measures.
Aboriginal Health Services and the state
In 1971 members of the Aboriginal community of Redfern, Sydney, took
action to create a health service for their community. This service, like the
Victorian Aboriginal Health Service which commenced operation shortly
after, was initially run on a voluntary basis. After some months of
operation both services were given a grant from the then very new
Commonwealth Department of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA). The events of
this period revolutionised the delivery of health care to Aboriginal people.
There are now over 90 such organisations across Australia, funded by the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), DAA's
successor, or by a mix of ATSIC and State-derived funds. In this section it
is our intention to briefly review the history of the formation of
Commonwealth-funded Aboriginal community-controlled health services;
their relations with the state (in particular the Commonwealth); their
current functions and mechanisms of funding.
A detailed history of the administration of AHS funding would need to take
account of their development within the context of both Australian
federalism and the ongoing transformation of Australia's internal colonial
relations. The history of Aboriginal health service provision is littered with
many examples of State and Commonwealth-funded programs either
competing directly for clients, or at least operating parallel to each other
(Saggers and Gray 1991; Nathan and Japanangka 1983; Robbins 1993;
Kunitz 1994). At times, conflict between different systems of
administration has crystallised into competing ideological positions, with
the Commonwealth championing self-management strategies against
recalcitrant states such as Queensland which until the 1980s steadfastly
maintained an assimilationist position and provided little in the way of
funding (Kunitz 1994). In the Northern Territory and Western Australia,
assimilationist health servicing policies were modified in the 1980s and
1990s to incorporate the rhetoric of community control. Nevertheless,
while some departmental personnel are genuinely supportive of such
policies, the assertion of community control has been used, in some cases,
as an excuse for cost-cutting in which the State or Territory hands over
inadequate funds to a community (resulting in inadequate services) and
leaving them to deal with the result. With no clear delineation of
responsibilities, even obvious gaps in the delivery of services to Aboriginal
communities can remain unfilled, as different sectors of government
abdicate their own responsibilities in favour of other agencies. At times the
existence of other agencies or levels of government becomes a raison
d'etre for inaction, and for underspending on Aboriginal citizens (Altman
and Sanders 1995).
What is generally uncontested within the context of Commonwealth-
Aboriginal community relations is the need for Aboriginal self-
determination. What is contested are the meanings and practices that
should cohere around this principle. As a principle of policy, 'self-
determination' signified a shift in the form of regulation and surveillance of
Aboriginal life. It opened a social space into which Aboriginal action could
occur without the supervision of the Aboriginal welfare system. However,
as a principle of political action self-determination signifies a 'more general
principle of action of Aboriginal people and their communities, especially
in relation to non-Aboriginal institutionsand society' (Anderson 1994). The
differences are often subtle, but nevertheless important. The assertion of
Aboriginal autonomy as a principle of political action is bound to lead to
political conflict with any system of regulation.
There has been at times resistance within the Commonwealth Aboriginal
affairs bureaucracy to the imposition of mechanisms of rationality.
Particularly in the early days of the DAA, there was a 'basic conflict ...
between the ideal of "quick and positive response" and the reality of
Treasury regulations and audit requirements' (Bennett, citing Gray 1989:
95-96). It should be noted that 'evidence of premature transfer of funds, the
setting of salaries without checking of public service guidelines, the
advancing of funds without authority and the unauthorised purchase of
supplies', suggests that departmental operations in the late 1970s were
affected by more than just an ideological position about the urgency of
need in Aboriginal Australia (Bennett 1989: 95).
The DAA throughout its history was at the periphery of the
Commonwealth bureaucratic apparatus. This position insulated the
department from some of the earlier incursions of economic rationalism
into the Commonwealth system of public administration (Pusey 1991).
Even ATSIC, as a statutory authority remains quite peripheral to the
machinations of the Commonwealth apparatus. The low status of
Aboriginal affairs has also meant that the DAA tended to inherit some
remarkably ineffectual government ministers (Bennett 1989). Nevertheless,
despite an early culture of 'getting the job done', the later development of
the DAA was marked by increasing centralisation of activities, and
increasing adherence to bureaucratic regimes. The introduction of program
budgeting in 1989 completed the transition to a new culture of managerial
rationality.
AMS emerged through the 1970s as the Aboriginal movement exploited the
liberalisation of policy on Aboriginal affairs. As organisations, the AHS
were community initiatives into which Aboriginal values and practices
were incorporated. For example, the particular importance placed on kin
relationships has resulted in the creation of organisational structures in
which the boundaries between private and public social spheres are
considerably blurred.
There are two fundamental qualities inherent in the approach promoted by
the community-controlled health services. The first is the two-way skills
transfer process between (usually) non-Aboriginal professional staff and
Aboriginal health workers which is seen as integral to effective program
delivery. Secondly, the principle of self-determination is embedded in the
organisational operation of the services, as well as being a principle of
health care practice (Anderson 1994). For this and other reasons, the
impact of AHS in the communities they service is far more complex than
that of a service provision agency and their clients. AHS, operating
effectively, can become strategic sites for community development
(Bartlett and Legge 1994).
As initiatives founded on the idea of community control the idea of
community accountability is central to their operation. Nevertheless, the
meanings and practices attached to the idea of community accountability
are distinct, although not entirely unrelated, to corresponding bureaucratic
notions. The best examples of conflicting ideas of accountability centre on
the use of government grant funds to support community members in times
of crisis. Whilst an Aboriginal administrator may see that it is their
responsibility to pay for the petrol so that an aunty or uncle can attend a
distant funeral, such action places the community organisation in breach of
grant conditions unless the conditions of grant allow for this type of
expenditure. In this circumstance the administrator may be acting
responsibly in a community context, but irresponsibly from the point of
view of the funding agency.
There is no national consensus among key stakeholders regarding the
division of funding and administrative responsibilities for the core
functions of AHS. In part this is a consequence of the submission-driven
basis for AHS funding. Resource allocation is based on the strength and
persuasiveness of the argument presented by the local agency, rather than
by reaching consensus on the appropriate range of core functions which the
Commonwealth funds. Many AHS receive a mix of funding from the State
and the Commonwealth. However, the nature of the mix depends more on
historical circumstance than any rational design.
It would be nonsensical, however, to take the position that all AHS should
deliver the same range of programs in the same manner. This would ignore
the diversity of Aboriginal circumstance and undermine the ability of local
organisations to respond flexibly and creatively to the contingencies of
local variables. Rather than proscriptively choosing the necessary functions
of an AHS, it should be possible through consensus with key stakeholders,
to determine the range of possible program initiatives that the
Commonwealth will fund. This does require greater clarity about the
division of funding responsibilities between the various possible agencies,
and between the Commonwealth and the States, and this is an intractable
problem area for the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, the health service
delivery issue constitutes a prime example of the urgent need for working
protocols to be established between Commonwealth, State and other
agencies.
Despite the lack of clarity in resource allocation policy, AHS have evolved
across the nation to provide a broadly consistent range of services. These
include: primary clinical care, some secondary (or specialist) clinical
services, child immunisation and developmental surveillance programs,
dental services, education and skill development programs, health
promotion/public health programs and research activities. Local factors or
needs have shaped the range of programs at the local level. Equally potent
has been the circumstance of history: the efficacy of local politicians and
AHS staff; the responsiveness of that particular State government; and the
quality of the relationship between that organisation and the
Commonwealth Aboriginal affairs bureaucracy.
Indicators of the distribution of health and of health care
The WHO has provided its member states with a framework for monitoring
progress towards the goal of 'health for all by the year 2000' which is
intended to assist countries to develop indicators of progress. However,
indicators are also needed to illustrate differences in health situations
within countries, in order to reflect progress towards closing the gap
between those who 'have health' and those who do not. This, WHO states,
is a fundamental principle for the selection and use of indicators relating to
primary health care (WHO 1981: 12).
WHO proposes four categories of indicators at a macro level:
i health policy indicators
ii social and economic indicators
iii indicators of the provision of health care
iv indicators of health status and quality of life
It is perhaps significant that the first set of indicators suggested by WHO
(health policy indicators) are what it refers to as 'indicators of political
commitment', and these should, WHO suggests, be demonstrated initially
by a high-level commitment to a policy statement or health charter. The
seriousness of political commitment, can only be measured by the extent to
which socially relevant development strategies such as primary health care
are actually being implemented' (WHO 1981: 18). The allocation of
adequate financial resources is considered by WHO to be a prime indicator
of political commitment to strategies such as health for all. WHO considers
that it is necessary to have indicators relating to the degree of equity of
distribution of financial resources, for example, to know the proportion and
geographical distribution of the populations who do not have access to
clean water or primary health care services. The formation of national goals
and targets is an important element of a strategic approach to achieving
equity in health (that is equal access to equal care appropriate to need) and
health care.
So how does Australia measure up against these internationally identified
criteria of political commitment to improve health? While its health policy
performance concerning the total population is good in terms of Aboriginal
health there is still no Aboriginal health policy at a national level, and
neither is there an endorsed set of priorities, goals and targets for
Aboriginal health (Department of Community Services and Health 1988;
Department of Health, Housing and Community Services 1993). The
document which conies closest is the National Aboriginal Health Strategy
(NAHS) Working Party report. While this document, with $232m funding
to implement the strategy, was intended to produce measurable outcomes,
it did not nominate goals or articulate a policy in it's 1989 report (NAHS
Working Party 1989). An additional committee had to be set up to advise
on the structural arrangements recommended in the NAHS (Aboriginal
Health Development Group 1989). Consequently, as part of the
Commonwealth Government's Better Health Program, two consultants (a
medical professional and an Aboriginal health professional) were engaged
by the Commonwealth Department of Health in 1990 to compile a
document on goals and targets in Aboriginal health.
By June 1991 the draft goals and targets had been drawn up and around
700 copies were distributed across the country for comment and feedback
(Wronski and Smallwood n.d.). Only 27 responses were received. The draft
set of goals and targets subsequently became the subject of disagreement
between the States and Territories, tripartite forums, the Council for
Aboriginal Health and Aboriginal community-controlled organisations, and
as a result have never been fully endorsed (Gordon 1994). Nevertheless,
some State governments are using the draft as it was intended by the
authors, as 'milestones' against which health services could monitor their
progress. The interim set of goals and targets has an ambivalent place in the
process of evaluating the NAHS. In effect, there are no accepted, nationally
agreed-upon criteria against which to evaluate the NAHS, nor Aboriginal
health as a whole. The evaluation report states baldly, There were no
effective accountability mechanisms implemented by either the
Commonwealth or by the States and Territories to measure progress'
(Gordon 1994: 11).
The introduction of program budgeting and DAA
Despite its somewhat institutionally peripheral position within the
Commonwealth public service, Aboriginal affairs administration was by no
means completely insulated from the moves to transform the culture of
Australian public administrative systems. The program management and
budgeting initiative has been a major element of budget reforms introduced
by the Commonwealth Government since 1984 (Barrett 1992: 3). Program
budgeting, the setting of objectives and measurement of performance
against them, was a formal part of the Government's financial processes by
the late 1980s. The financial management improvement program, one part
of this overall strategy, 'with its focus on better resource management
through clearer objectives and enhanced information systems to assist
evaluation of these objectives, was aimed particularly at managers in the
line agencies' (Williams 1993: 40). Throughout this process, central
agencies such as the Commonwealth Department of Finance have
redefined their role to centralise the importance of evaluating program
performance and assisting departments to improve their financial
management (Williams 1993). These reforms had been influenced by
overseas initiatives in the government and private sectors, and
organisations such as WHO, which stressed 'management by objectives'
(Barrett 1992: 4). Ministers and departments were asked in late 1987 to
prepare evaluation plans, and by 1989 all Commonwealth departments had
introduced program budgeting to enable the Government 'to better focus on
the objectives and achievements of programs' (DAA 1989).
In the case of Aboriginal health, it was true that prior to this, evaluation
had been haphazard to the extent that the 1979 House of Representatives
Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs (HRSCAA) report on
Aboriginal health observed that 'in the absence of definitive information
the Committee has not been able to make a judgment on the effectiveness
of any of the various health programs discussed in this report'. It went on to
recommend that suitable criteria should be established 'so that standardised
information can be collated and that funds be provided for this purpose
where programs are funded by the government' (HRSCAA 1979: 109).
As a result of these policy changes throughout the Commonwealth, DAA
circulated a draft document in December 1986 entitled 'Performance
Indicators - Aboriginal Health Services' which produced heated discussion
among AHS. Several AHS undertook detailed analyses of the DAA
document, making suggestions for changes. The overall response of the
Aboriginal health sector, expressed through their umbrella organisation at
the time, the National Aboriginal and Islander Health Organisation
(NAIHO), was hostile; NAIHO interpreted the performance indicators as
an 'intrusion by the DAA1 (NAIHO 1987: 9). More specifically, NAIHO
objections to the 1986 performance indicators were as follows:
i the inappropriateness of DAA formulating priorities in health
ii the absence of a national Aboriginal health policy, aims or objectives
(thus measuring outcomes against a non-existent yardstick)
iii tying funding to quantifiable health improvements
iv emphasis on empirical over-interpretive data as indicators
v unprofessional and uninformed selection of indicators.
In 1987 letters were sent to AHS requiring them to submit six monthly
throughput indicators to DAA. These were as follows:
i monthly total of consultations with doctors
ii monthly total of consultations with sisters
iii monthly total of consultations with Aboriginal health workers at the
health service and at homes
iv number of educational and preventive programs conducted during
the month
v number of people who attended these programs
vi monthly total of consultations with dentist (where available).
NAIHO argued that DAA was not the appropriate body to be formulating
priorities in Aboriginal health: 'the imposition of a series of pre-determined
performance indicators shall in effect amount to the establishment of de
facto priorities for a particular service' (NAIHO 1987: 9). There were
simply no detailed policies or objectives on which to base the indicators
other than the global objective to 'raise the standard of Aboriginal health to
that of the Australian community generally'.
Another major concern to emerge was the proposition to tie funding to
quantifiable changes in health status. This was highlighted by the
unfortunate experience of the Aboriginal Medical Service in Walgett, New
South Wales which was offered funding in November 1986 on condition
that it accomplish certain improvements in health status by 1988. These
improvements included reducing hospital admissions (by 20 per cent), and
the incidence of diabetes and sexually transmitted diseases (by 10 per cent).
While it appears that these unrealistic and impossible demands made on an
Aboriginal health service was an atypical event involving an inexperienced
DAA officer, Moodie used the example to effect as part of a critique of the
handling of the performance indicators issue on the part of DAA (Moodie
1989).
By 1989, the last DAA Program Budgeting Manual reiterated that ongoing
funding was tied to the provision of performance data by grant recipients,
and these were divided into national and project level information (DAA
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1989). Grant recipients were required to report six monthly and provide
data on the following performance indicators:
i National level: births; deaths; morbidity rates for different diseases;
hospitalisation rates; immunisation rates; infant mortality rates;
ii Project level: client population; number of consultations by doctor,
nurse, Aboriginal health worker, others; prevalence rates for
significant ill health conditions; immunisation rates (dental if
appropriate).
The collection of these data was the beginning of a planned reporting
process whereby regional, state and central offices were, in turn, to
accumulate the data from the initial reports, and then transform them into a
performance report to the Secretary of DAA, the Minister and Parliament.
The initial mishandling of the introduction of performance indicators in
Aboriginal health by the DAA was unfortunate, for it antagonised the
Aboriginal health sector, whose cooperation was crucial to their successful
implementation. The hostility towards 'measuring performance' has lasted
for many years, and explains the subsequent difficulties in gaining national
Aboriginal endorsement of other government initiatives, such as the
establishment of national goals and targets for Aboriginal health. It is
worth noting that when the Commonwealth introduced its program
evaluation strategy, many agencies expressed concern that the strategy
would reimpose a form of central oversight that was 'contrary to the spirit
of devolution of control, a centrepiece of the government's public
management reforms' (Barrett 1992: 18). One defender of this process has
argued that this was not the intention and it has not eventuated.
Nevertheless, Australia does appear to have placed 'a greater emphasis on
institutionalising the link between evaluation and the budget than other
nations' (Barrett 1992: 17).
ATSIC and the National Aboriginal Health Strategy
There has been a gap in the development of Aboriginal health policy-
making mechanisms which has implications for performance evaluation.
Effective policy development is a strategic means of establishing principles
of action and in this context must engage all the key stakeholders. The lack
of a national Aboriginal health policy apparatus has also jeopardised the
implementation of the NAHS, including the establishment of national goals
and targets, and performance indicators.
The release of the NAHS Working Party report in 1989 coincided with the
legislative program to create ATSIC. One of the key recommendations
within the NAHS Working Party report was for a strategic approach to
improved coordination of resource allocation and policy development in
Aboriginal health. As such the NAHS Working Party recommended the
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creation of tripartite forums at a State and Commonwealth level, which
drew membership from the State and Commonwealth sectors and from
Aboriginal communities. Unfortunately, the creation of ATSIC with its
own in-built consultative mechanisms was not anticipated in this approach
to improving intersectoral collaboration (Codd 1993: 16; Bartlett and
Legge 1994). ATSIC subsumed the role of the DAA, which at the
Commonwealth level gave it the lead role in implementing the Council for
Aboriginal Health (the national tripartite forum); as well as the
responsibility for providing the Council with necessary secretariat support
(the Office of Aboriginal Health).
The Council for Aboriginal Health met twice following a two-year delay in
its formation, at which stage it was reviewed at the instigation of the
Ministers for Aboriginal Affairs and Health, Housing and Community
Services. This unilateral action from the Commonwealth alienated non-
Commonwealth stakeholders (Codd 1993: introduction). Nevertheless, the
Codd review recommended the continuing operation of the Council for
Aboriginal Health, with slightly modified terms of reference. These terms
of reference included the monitoring of the implementation of the NAHS,
as well as developing national Aboriginal health policies. The review was
delivered in March 1993. The Council has not met since.
The failure of ATSIC to operationalise the Council for Aboriginal Health
thus undermined the sustained development of Aboriginal health policy.
ATSIC's own consultative structure does not in any way compensate for
this lack. The Regional Councils of ATSIC are essentially funding
allocation bodies and have little scope for policy development. The Board
of Commissioners does not necessarily include anyone with experience of
health service delivery. The National Aboriginal Community Controlled
Health Organisation (NACCHO), the successor to NAIHO, has no
resources to meet under its own volition. Finally, until very recently, there
have been no formal links between ATSIC and the other key
Commonwealth agency - the Department of Human Services and Health
(DHSH). The recently formed Joint Planning Committee for Aboriginal
Health Services (which has NACCHO, ATSIC, DHSH, and National
Health and Medical Research Centre (NHMRC) representation) is
primarily a funding-allocation apparatus (for additional Commonwealth
monies available in 1994-95) and has no collaborative policy-oriented
functions. Given that improved intersectoral collaboration was a key
component of the NAHS this has been a key deficiency in the
implementation of the strategy.
ATSIC and health performance indicators
ATSIC has a responsibility under section 7 of it's Act to 'monitor the
effectiveness of programs, including those conducted by bodies other than
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ATSIC. In the first two years of ATSIC's operations, 1990-92, grant
agreements continued to utilise the old DAA throughput measures. In
1992-93 ATSIC sent out the manual in which the 'local' program
performance indicators were inadvertently omitted, leaving only the
'national' performance indicators being requested from health services.
Once the mistake was discovered, letters were sent out asking people to
ignore them; but several health services sent in these inappropriate data
anyway. These data (including births and deaths, infant mortality rates) are
only useable epidemiologically when collected from much larger
population groups. A population with between five and ten births a year
cannot sensibly provide figures on an 'infant mortality rate'. In 1992-93,
some AHS sent in indicators according to the incorrect 'national'
guidelines; others ignored them (as instructed by ATSIC); and others
negotiated new performance indicators of their own with regional offices.
The error highlights a key problem with the identification of performance
indicators by ATSIC and by DAA before it; namely, neither ATSIC nor
DAA have ever been the sole actors in the provision of health services or
programs to Aborigines, as is the case with other key services such as
housing, education and employment. They have always been
supplementary to (or in some cases substituting for) existing services
provided through States; even if ATSIC is the primary funder of an
Aboriginal community-controlled health service, such a service only
provides primary health care, and has limited impact on secondary health
care such as hospital treatment and access to other tiers of health care. This
means that, like its predecessor, ATSIC cannot be held responsible for
Aboriginal health status in general, and any indicators of performance that
it can collect will always, of necessity, be only partial indicators.
The 1993-94 ATSIC Program Policy and Guidelines Statements continue
to list the 'national' performance indicators, while noting optimistically that
they are under review as a result of the implementation of the NAHS and
partly due to ATSIC's ongoing evaluation processes. ATSIC also noted at
this time that with the introduction of the National Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Health Goals and Targets 'more information will be
available to examine the success or otherwise of the policies and programs
developed as a result of the Strategy'. With the creation of an Office of
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Services in DHSH following
the 1994-95 budget, it is expected that this office will take on board the
negotiations for the creation of these goals and targets.
The ATSIC Operational Plan for 1993-94 provides a little more
information, also mentioning that the program performance indicators are
in the process of being developed but adding that once formulated, they
will focus on the following:
i the number of people accessing ATSIC funding programs;
ii community participation in and control over health programs;
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the training undertaken to ensure the appropriate service provision;
monitoring of key activities, such as health promotion and
prevention, immunisation, screening and surveillance.
Some of these suggested indicators concern the provision of health care,
which are very different from indicators linked to health status and indeed
the Operational Plan for 1993-94 notes for the first time that the Vital
statistics' on births and deaths, morbidity, hospitalisation, immunisation
and infant mortality will be provided by the Australian Institute of Health
and Welfare. This suggests that a decision has finally been made that it
would be inappropriate for ATSIC to ask small AHS to collect and submit
such information.
According to the Daffen Report commissioned by ATSIC, there is at
present 'no matrix in place to collect, collate or analyse published
Performance Indicators' (Daffen 1994: 136). No new performance
indicators have been identified. The 1994 Funding Procedures Manual does
not specify the performance indicators that accompany letters of offer, the
space is left blank: at present AHS can identify these for themselves,
presumably in negotiation with ATSIC regional offices. In short, the
process of formulating useful health indicators is not yet resolved. Neither
has it been resolved exactly what performance the indicators are assessing:
funding efficiency, staff effectiveness, number of clients or prevalence of
illness, which are all indicative of different types of activities and services.
There has not yet been a selection and refinement of indicators to satisfy
the differing requirements of financial accountability, provision and
effectiveness of service, and progress towards specific goals. Neither has
there been any support provided to AHS (either advice or funding) to assist
them in formulating their own objectives and internal evaluations.
At present the data on progress reporting and performance indicators are
sent by AHS to regional offices of ATSIC, who in turn write a report with
a profile of each community, a report on activities covering every
component of ATSIC programs (population profile, number and type of
programs and so on). These go to State offices, where a state-wide
overview of information is compiled and sent to Canberra where the Health
Policy Section should ideally compile a national picture. In practice, this
has not been possible because of the poor standard of data collected so far.
Central office is aware that there are difficulties in data collection at the
local level, with inadequate human and computer resources.
Available indicators and progress reports are sent by the ATSIC branch to
the Office of Evaluation and Audit (OEA), to Senate Estimates Committee
and are used for the ATSIC Annual Report. The OEA in ATSIC has the
responsibility to regularly evaluate and audit the operations of the
Commission and is accountable to Parliament, but also to Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander people through reports to the Commission. The
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Office has given broad evaluative activities a much greater focus than was
previously the case in either DAA or the Aboriginal Development
Corporation (ADC) (Dillon 1992: 96). It conducts two forms of audit:
focus audits of programs, which are oriented to efficiency, and evaluations;
to date 90 per cent of OEA's recommendations have been endorsed (Daffen
1994: 89). The Office has undertaken an internal (confidential)evaluation
of ATSIC's health section, and some of their findings were contributed to
the evaluation of the NAHS in 1994.
The view from the ground
Early performance indicator requests resulted in health services compiling
tables noting the monthly totals for presentations in categories such as
cardiovascular, respiratory, diabetes, trauma or skin. But, as one AHS
administrator noted, 'It is not possible from the available figures to assess
in what areas improvement has occurred or whether this improvement will
be sustained' (Koteka 1988). However, the same health service was able to
measure a drop in outpatient consultations as well as alcohol related
injuries at one stage, and suggest reasons why this had occurred. Health
service administrators often made additional notes when they sent in their
performance indicators, commenting on the numbers of births as opposed
to deaths, pointing out the fundamental constraints on health improvement
due to STD and diabetes rates, or pertinent observations on health status.
They reveal a level of frustration with the expectation that a small health
service can deliver on health outcomes which largely remain outside their
jurisdiction:
from the morbidity figures the population of both communities are rather
unhealthy. This is not surprising in view of the poor hygiene and living
conditions, poor nutrition, abuse of alcohol and volatile substances, lack of
understanding and acceptance of some of the causes of diseases and their methods
of prevention and control. These contributing factors to ill health could be
overcome provided there is community determination and a will to improve. No
matter how good a health service is provided, we will have little impact on the
health of the people if these basic issues are not resolved (Koteka 1988: 4).
Unrealistic outcome measures have the less than useful effect of
highlighting the enormity of the task to what are often small, under-
resourced health services. These apparently 'poor' outcomes can then be
used by the bureaucracy to imply that some services are not doing a good
enoughjob.
Health services have received no feedback on the performance indicators
they submit (either before or after the commencement of ATSIC), or on the
more personal comments that may be sent in by individual health
administrators. This reinforces the widespread view that performance
indicators have been instigated for purely financial accounting purposes,
rather than to encourage some collaborative evaluation exercise which
would be helpful to the AHS.
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It has been noted by the researchers that some regional officers of ATS1C
have urged health services to 'just put anything down' in order to satisfy the
requirements. A new draft Aboriginal Health Strategy for South Australia
presents, as an imaginary negative case study, what has been the real-life
situation of AHS sending in their performance indicators:
The funding body doesn't comment, except on late submission, and the statistics
are virtually meaningless without comparison and analysis to identify and
ascertain reasons for trends. They are unrelated to statewide goals or strategies.
They are activity statistics suggesting staff work hard but do not indicate whether
or not health is improving ... It is onerous for services to collect meaningless
statistics which disappear into a 'bureaucratic void'. It is also a poor basis for
evaluation (Aboriginal Health Council of South Australia 1994: 66).
The 1993-94 financial year saw the continuation of confusion regarding the
performance information required from AHS. Ensuring that AHS provide
performance indicator data is a regional office function. Regional offices
are generally under-staffed, have a high staff turnover and do not employ
staff who necessarily have any experience of health service delivery. AHS
continue to be required to provide information on what DAA officers
initially construed as national performance data. In addition, some AHS
have also provided data previously required by the DAA which related to
the number of active files and the number of consultations performed by
doctors, health workers and nurses. Some agencies were also asked to
provide a narrative description of program activities. It is very difficult for
AHS administrators to operate effectively in an environment in which their
prime funding agency cannot introduce some consistency to the most
routine aspects of the funding/grant acquittal process.
In its document on the development of indicators, the WHO acknowledges
that the question of selectivity of indicators is crucial, particularly for
developing countries where health services are rarely adequate to permit
routine information collection. 'It is still very difficult', the document
observes, 'to get the information where it matters most - at the community-
level'(WHO 1981: 7).
WHO identified some of the issues that arise from local community-level
collections:
In the field of health, routine health service data are an essential source of
information on disease-specific morbidity and mortality, on certain measurements
of children, and on the various activities carried out by the health services. This
information, obtained from ongoing programmes, is relatively cheap and easy to
collect and analyse. It is, however, incomplete and often inaccurate, especially
when those responsible for collecting it at the periphery are not taught how to use
it themselves; are overburdened with so much form-filling that this activity
seriously interferes with their service functions; have no feedback or see no
relevance in collecting the information; or are generally unsupervised. There is
another drawback when the data collected are not oriented towards particular
problems to be solved or tasks to be fulfilled. The record systems of health
services are often kept for administrative purposes rather than for monitoring,
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which means that data on required denominators are not available - for example
the population at risk or the population to be covered by a particular service
(WHO 1981: 16).
The 'success' of health services in meeting the needs of their clients, and
fulfilling administrative requirements for their funding agencies is
determined by a wide range of factors including the skills of clinic staff;
the rate of staff turnover; the relationship between the health service and
other community staff (store, office etc.) or organisations; and the influence
of fluctuating community problems. The quality and severity of these
problems vary according to socio-historical context, and geographical
location. However, it does mean that even simple administrative tasks can
be at times extraordinarily difficult.
Conceptual problems: what performance indicators are appropriate?
The current performance indicators requested by ATSIC are a mixture of
outcome and throughput or process measures. Before considering some of
the conceptual difficulties in developing appropriate performance
indicators for ATSIC's health and community development program it is
worthwhile returning to the Department of Finance documents which
outline the conceptual basis for the use of performance indicators within
program budgeting:
It is important to emphasise, however, that the role of performance indicators is
to inform judgements rather than to replace them. It is not required or expected
that any one indicator, or even set of indicators, will provide a definitive
measure of program accomplishment. Rather their role is in indicating, or
focusing attention on, relevant areas to identify corrective action (by individual
program managers, the responsible Minister, or the Government, as appropriate)
might be required or where more intensive evaluation is needed (Department of
Finance 1985: 2 original emphasis).
Performance indicators are only one part of the evaluation of program
activity. They do not replace the need for internal organisational review,
nor intensive externally driven evaluation. However, it would appear that a
number of evaluative processes have been collapsed onto the development
of performance indicators for ATSIC's health program. There is a need for
the conceptual separation of the evaluative activities which are concerns of
the State, such as the indicators of the distribution of health care and health
care services; indicators relating to the performance of the ATSIC health
program; and evaluative activities oriented at assessing the operation of an
individual AHS.
Aboriginal community organisations are more than mere sites of the
interface between service resources and Aboriginal people. In a complex
way they have become integral to the production and sustenance of the
social relations which are often glossed under the rubric of 'communities'.
This is especially true in urban communities where the only public space
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which can be construed as 'Aboriginal' is indeed that of the Aboriginal
organisation. This was recently highlighted at a public meeting in
Melbourne, where one woman, addressing the problem of organisational
instability stated simply, 'take away our organisations and we have
nothing'. It is around this form of relationship with community that the
service functions of AHS are built. As a result of this complex relationship
between function and context, and because many of the necessary elements
of successful operation of AHS remain opaque to quantification it is
inconceivable that AHS be thought of as a simple production process -
which characterised the development of performance indicators under the
program budgeting regime (Department of Finance 1985).
Further, the social relations which underlie the development of AHS would
not support an evaluative framework which gave the funding agency the
ability to manipulate organisational function (in the absence of a particular
crisis in operation). AHS operate within a policy framework of self-
determination. They are unlikely ever to cede this to a higher level
bureaucratic agency. This does not mean an absence of evaluative activity.
Rather the development of internal and peer review evaluation mechanisms
should play a vital role in any health service.
In the previous section we discussed the difficulties in data collection at the
local level. Now we discuss in broad terms the issues around developing
valid measures of performance, which can be consistently applied in AHS
across Australia. To develop successfully the performance criteria
envisaged by the Department of Finance it would be necessary for the
indicators to fulfil the following conditions:
Consistency: Are the variables of equal validity in different contexts. Is
it possible to identify common program activities.
Feasibility: Can the data be feasibly collected in even the most
undeveloped context lacking resources.
Validity: Is the variable measure of performance which reflects
solely on the activities being measured.
A key difficulty in defining performance indicators for Aboriginal health is
consistency. Rate measures which involve defining population
denominators, are the only true measures of performance as they define
actual activity or outcome relative to a potential total. Nevertheless, while
it may be possible to define rates in contexts where there is an unequivocal
service population (as in some remote and discrete communities), in an
urban context any rate measure, as a measure of performance, is highly
problematic. There are both high population movements (particularly to
and from regional rural centres), and multiple sites of service (both
Aboriginal and mainstream). Further, even though there are similarities in
the activities of AHS across Australia there are also significant variations
which reflect the mix of funding; the local context (which is particularly
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relevant to promotion of public health programs) and the stage of service
development. What this suggests is that program evaluation will be more
meaningful if adapted to the local or regional context, longitudinally, rather
than attempting to evaluate on a national cross-sectional sample.
There is a substantial medical literature which has attempted to define
those health outcomes which are amenable to improvement by medical
intervention alone. These include: tuberculosis mortality; malignant
neoplasm of the cervix; Hodgkin's disease; chronic rheumatic heart disease;
hypertensive disease; cerebrovascular disease; appendicitis; gallstone
disease; maternal deaths (Rutstein et al. 1976; Charlton and Velez 1986;
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 1994). There is considerable
dispute about what can be included on this list, and the discussions refer
only to amenable causes of mortality, not morbidity. The significance of
these causes of amenable mortality is that they serve as warning signs, and
can be used to measure the quality of medical care, as Westerling notes:
avoidable mortality such as perinatal and maternal mortality [are] negative
indices of health ... these causes of death [are] a warning signal, a sentinel health
event, indicating that the quality of care may need to be improved (1992: 489).
But as noted earlier, it is not feasible to collect mortality data from AHS.
Measures of morbidity generated at point of contact with health services do
not provide a picture of actual community morbidity. They actually provide
data on the relation between people with illness and the health service.
Apart from the collection of notifiable disease data, actual morbidity
prevalence or incidence can be measured only through techniques which
require random sampling. Finally, the time frame for producing health
transitions in many of the key aspects of Aboriginal morbidity (for example
the chronic degenerative diseases) is outside the scope of the funding
cycles. For some of these conditions it is far more appropriate to take a
generational view, rather than a medium term cycle such as a decade.
It may be possible to view risk reduction as an outcome which is
measurable (pap smear rates, screening/treatments rates for hypertension,
and percentage of people smoking). It could be argued that these measures
would relate to effort and not outcomes. However, the difference between a
process (activity) indicator and an outcome indicator can at times be
arguable. For example, measurement of blood pressure is, from a micro
perspective, a measure of work or process. From a macro perspective, an
effective system of blood pressure screening is an integral component of
the effective management of hypertensive disease, and therefore directly an
integral component of the prevention of cardiovascular disease. It should
be noted that most of these measures require estimates of denominators
which is difficult to arrive at in most service contexts. Finally, some
measures of risk reduction can only be read longitudinally. For example,
cervical dysplasia may increase rather than decrease in the early stages of
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program implementation and represent a health improvement, rather than a
decline.
ATSIC-funded health programs are not the only provider of services to
Aboriginal people. State-funded programs and mainstream programs can
play a significant role. It is, therefore, extremely difficult to argue that any
health outcome reflects the 'performance' of ATSIC's health program.
We do not wish to suggest that health services have no impact on morbidity
and mortality. We know that they do and that health services should not be
dismissed as a bottomless pit into which money is dropped from which
there is no measurable benefit. The point is, as Kunitz states, that such
services can and do make a difference (Kunitz 1994: 182). Under certain
circumstances, accessible care has had a noticeable impact on health -
infant, child and maternal mortality, and in the severity of infectious
diseases - while having less impact on the severity of non-infectious
chronic diseases.
What we are suggesting is that, with the exception of a very few morbidity
risk reduction measures, it is not possible to define health outcomes which
are feasibly measured by AHS. Even those which may be suitably used are
rendered problematic by the difficulties in defining population
denominators, in assessing the possible impact of other health agencies,
and the fact that most measures could only feasibly be generated through
service usage and therefore provide a very partial insight into community
morbidity or risk. Health outcome measures, on the whole, must be
separated from funding processes. They are a measure of the overall
performance of the State and appropriately need to be tied to macro
resource allocation processes such as the overall allocation of resources
into Aboriginal health, not as measures of performance of the Aboriginal
health dollar. Consequently, they must more appropriately be tied to
measures of political commitment and resource allocation as suggested by
WHO.
Throughput or process measures as performance indicators are
problematic. Measures such as number of consultations per year do
indicate effort, and a funding agency may wish to establish that such effort
is occurring. However, such indicators do not measure performance or
quality of service. As crude figures these data are actually meaningless. If a
service sees a given number of people a year, does this mean that they are
being effective? What happens if the number of consultations increases?
This could mean that the AHS has made its programs more accessible.
Alternatively, it could mean that their public health program is failing and
community morbidity has increased.
In the original Department of Finance documentation the hegemonic role of
numbers was apparent. Yet it may be the lowest ranked indicators, the
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narrative or qualitative indicators, that are the most useful in the context of
AHS. It is entirely appropriate that a health service demonstrate the range
of program activities which have been developed, and include locally
developed measures of performance, or evaluation comments. Further, it is
appropriate that the service demonstrate that certain forms of activity,
integral to sustaining viable operations are occurring. These may include:
i evidence of planning and internal evaluation;
ii evidence of community participation, mechanisms used to guarantee
community accountability;
iii evidence of training and skills development.
Given the small number of services (under 100), it is still possible to
produce narrative assessments of program activity and have these reports
assessed by a central office staff. Assuming an effectively functioning
regional office, ATSIC or the Commonwealth DHSH, (the responsible
agency is still under discussion at the time of writing), should be able to
identify potential problems in program activities in particular sites, or even
on a regional or national basis. It does not replace locally based evaluation
which can more appropriately be contextualised against local circumstance
and developments. In-house evaluations can include, for example,
assessments of the quality of care by undertaking an audit of patients'
medical records, as these reflect the quality of patient examinations and the
relationship between health staff and patients; particularly in situations
where there is high staff turnover good records are crucial for the
continuity of care. There is now a considerable literature on health care
evaluation, program effectiveness, and health status indicators which can
be drawn upon (Public Health Association of Australia 1989; McClelland
et al. 1992; Nganampa Health Council 1993; South Australian Community
Health Research Unit 1994).
Given the pressures from central agencies in the Commonwealth public
sector it is unrealistic to expect that ATSIC, or any department that may in
future be responsible for monitoring AHS, could dispense entirely with
quantitative indicators, even though their interpretation is problematic and
their validity open to debate. That being the case, the most appropriate
indicators would be process indicators, with possibly some outcome
measures related to risk reduction. In the main, however, health outcome
measures should be separated from funding cycles.
Concluding points and policy recommendations
The development of performance indicators for AHS requires reassessment
and consensus from all the key stakeholders. It is, therefore, necessary for
the Commonwealth to commit itself to the formulation of a national
Aboriginal health policy apparatus which involves all the key stakeholders.
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A major part of this policy process, vital to the development of
performance evaluation, is the development and endorsement of realistic
national goals and targets.
With some exceptions, health outcome measures are inappropriate
performance indicators for AMS. They are, in effect, measures of the
performance of the State. Such national performance indicators should, as
argued by WHO, include measures of national political commitment using
analyses of resource allocation and ease of access to health care.
Information on State and national assessments and indicators need to be fed
back to AHS as the provision of data has often been a one-way process
(from the local organisation up to the central office). There are at present
no avenues whereby this might happen but suitable mechanisms of
feedback need to be discussed.
The development of appropriate performance indicators must take into
account the feasibility of data collection. The capacity of AHS in terms of
their physical infrastructure and human resources needs to be developed as
a priority. To date, the development of information management systems
within AHS has been extremely patchy. However, there are examples of
routinely-collected administrative data having a role in prevention and in
evaluation. For example, in Moree, New South Wales, a committee of
representatives of community-based and State health services and the
Aboriginal population, are setting up a system to collect and disseminate
information about the health status of the Aboriginal population. This will
be run by Aboriginal health workers and the adult Aboriginal population is
the primary target for feedback of results (South Australian Community
Health Research Unit 1994: 62). Some AHS have been involved in the
development of their own computerised health management system, such
as Health Planner which makes possible a preventive health program which
allows routine health checks (Speare and Kelly 1991: 110). Other agencies,
such as the Victorian Aboriginal Health Service, which has a client base of
approximately 5,700 patients spread across metropolitan Melbourne and
the state of Victoria, has attempted similar development, but has lacked the
necessary resources to complete this process.
If a funding body is genuinely supportive of self-determination, the
performance indicators provided by an AHS to the funding body should
reflect the needs of the client population or community. An AHS should be
properly resourced to determine the priorities and needs of that particular
community, and to develop appropriate indicators as to whether these are
being addressed. An AHS should also be properly resourced to negotiate
with the funding body on equal terms, so that appropriate indicators can be
included in the contract, service agreement or grant conditions. Small
services will probably need to employ outside personnel to assist them in
these processes and adequate resources should be available for them to
employ such personnel. In this way, it would be possible to avoid a
22
situation in which a State or Territory health department has divested itself
of the responsibility for delivery of health services to a community-
controlled AHS, but simultaneously exerts a strong influence by having its
departmental officers draw up elaborate service agreements including
performance indicators. It is difficult for community organisations
(particularly in remote regions) to be able to negotiate these agreements
properly, because they do not have the expertise. The result is often an
under-resourced health service with staff spending time collecting statistics
to satisfy departmental goals and targets, rather than those of the health
service.
Performance indicators, if developed as quantitative variables, need to be
valid and consistent measures of performance. There is a role for consistent
and accepted narrative indicators which monitor the scope of AHS
activities. The AHS should be called upon collectively to suggest
appropriate indicators and the resources necessary to develop the capacity
to collect them. There is also a need for support and professional advice to
be made available to AHS so that in-house evaluations are possible.
Performance indicators alone are no substitute for the development of local
mechanisms of evaluation which measure performance against the context
of a particular region and the stage of development of AHS. In order to
maintain a policy of self-determination in the development of evaluation
strategies, such mechanisms should include internal evaluation and peer
evaluation mechanisms. Accountability spreads in two directions: up to the
fund providers and down to the clients.
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